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TOWARD NATIONAL CRIMINAL BAR
ADMISSION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS
Gabriel J. Chin*
INTRODUCTION
In a nation with a busy and successful Uniform Law Commission, one of
whose mottoes is e pluribus unum, it is not surprising that there have been
repeated calls over past decades for nationalization of the bar. There have
been many arguments for national bar admission,1 as well as for a single
federal bar.2 Weighing in favor of these arguments is the rise of the Uniform
Bar Examination3 and the generalizable nature of legal training and skills,
coupled with the unfortunate fact that certain aspects of bar regulation,
historically, have been protectionist and exclusionary.4 On the other hand, it
* Edward L. Barrett Jr. Chair of Law and Martin Luther King Jr. Professor of Law, University
of California, Davis, School of Law. This Essay was prepared for the Colloquium entitled
The Judicial Role in Professional Regulation, hosted by the Fordham Law Review and the
Stein Center for Law and Ethics on October 9, 2020, at Fordham University School of Law.
Thanks to Yuki Hirai for excellent research assistance.
1. See, e.g., Marvin Comisky & Philip C. Patterson, The Case for a Federally Created
National Bar by Rule or by Legislation, 55 TEMP. L.Q. 945 (1982).
2. See, e.g., Ingrid Epperly, Who’s Afraid of a Uniform Federal Court Bar: Dispelling
Fears About Standardizing Admission and Regulation of Attorneys in Federal Courts, 22 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 811 (2009); Carol A. Needham, Splitting Bar Admission into Federal and
State Components: National Admission for Advice on Federal Law, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 453
(1997); John Okray, Attorney Admission Practices in the U.S. Federal Courts, FED. LAW.,
Sept. 2016, at 41, 41 (“While there has been a very slow but steady march toward
modernization of the legal profession, several pockets of outmoded and protectionist rules
continue to plague the practice. This article focuses on attorney admission requirements for
practicing in the various federal courts, and specifically who are the leaders and laggards in
this area.”); Gene A. Petersen, Why Not a National Bar Examination?, 55 A.B.A. J. 426
(1969).
3. See generally Marsha Griggs, Building a Better Bar Exam, 7 TEX. A&M L. REV. 1
(2019); Dennis R. Honabach, To UBE or Not to UBE: Reconsidering the Uniform Bar Exam,
22 PRO. LAW., no. 2, 2014, at 43; Jonathan Lippman, Embracing the Uniform Bar Exam in
New York: Toward a More Rational Bar Admissions Process Promoting Essential Lawyer
Mobility, 23 PRO. LAW., no. 3, 2016, at 8.
4. Sup. Ct. v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 70 (1988) (“We hold that Virginia’s residency
requirement for admission to the State’s bar without examination violates the Privileges and
Immunities Clause. The nonresident’s interest in practicing law on terms of substantial
equality with those enjoyed by residents is a privilege protected by the Clause.”); Sup. Ct. v.
Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 288 (1985) (“We conclude that New Hampshire’s bar residency
requirement violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, § 2, of the United States
Constitution.”); Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S.
717, 722 (1973); Comment, The South’s Amended Barratry Laws: An Attempt to End Group
Pressure Through the Courts, 72 YALE L.J. 1613, 1613 (1963).
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can be argued that lawyers should be familiar with—and tested on—the laws
of a particular jurisdiction, especially where those laws tend to be different
from those in other states or territories.
In the extensive litigation over bar admission in federal district courts,
courts have upheld state bar membership requirements.5 Nevertheless, the
changes to legal practice flowing from the COVID-19 pandemic—the
disconnection between workplace and residence, the ability to meet and to
hold court proceedings by video, and the unjustifiability of charging clients
time and travel for brief, perfunctory in-person meetings and conferences that
could be handled effectively and expeditiously online—will make these
questions ever more serious.
No commentator appears to have measured the arguments for and against
broader, unified bar admission and membership with respect to the
proposition that at least there should be a single, unified federal criminal bar.
This Essay proposes that there are compelling reasons that a lawyer regularly
admitted to the practice of law in a state or territory and to a federal district
court should be able to participate in a criminal case in any U.S. district court,
as counsel, cocounsel, or amicus. Similarly, practitioners with a regular
federal criminal practice in one state wishing to exercise the right to relocate
between states6 should be able to move to another district and engage in
regular practice there—even if the state bar in a lawyer’s new home will not
admit them—or, if the lawyer chooses, practice exclusively in federal court.
Under the current state of the law, fifty-seven federal districts require
membership in the state bar where the district is located and thirty-eight
admit lawyers admitted to other states or districts.7 The laws of all but eight
states allow an out-of-state lawyer with between three and five years of
experience to waive in without sitting for a bar examination,8 and in the other
forty-two states, it is possible to waive in to the state bar and thereby gain
admission to the federal court.9 Accordingly, the issue is most significant in
the fifteen districts that require state bar membership for federal practice and
are located in states that do not allow admission to the state bar on motion:
California, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Louisiana, Nevada, Rhode Island, and
South Carolina.10

5. See Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Multijurisdiction Prac. v. Simandle, 658 F.
App’x 127, 130 (3d Cir. 2016).
6. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502 (1999) (“Permissible justifications for discrimination
between residents and nonresidents are inapplicable to a nonresident’s exercise of the right to
move into another State and become a resident of that State.”).
7. See Yuki Hirai, Reciprocity for Attorney Bar Admission in the USDCs 2 (Sept. 9,
2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
8. NAT’L CONF. OF BAR EXAM’RS & AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. &
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS 42
(Judith A. Gundersen & Claire J. Guback eds., 2020), https://www.ncbex.org/
assets/BarAdmissionGuide/CompGuide2020_021820_Online_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/
X7ZL-TRTU] (detailing admission on motion, years of practice, and definition of practice).
9. Id.
10. See id.
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Much of the task of challenging restrictions on multijurisdictional practice
has been taken up by the National Association for the Advancement of
Multijurisdiction Practice (NAAMJP) and its leader, who have raised many
constitutional challenges to state and federal bar admission practices without
notable success.11 Given the modest demands of rational basis review,
perhaps almost no local restriction would be held unconstitutional;
borrowing from egregious rational basis cases, perhaps membership could
even be restricted to multigenerational families of lawyers,12 or those who
scored too high on some test or another could be rejected.13
But the duty of the federal courts is not achieved once the threshold of “not
unconstitutional” has been surmounted. Instead, Congress has charged the
federal courts with “the effective and expeditious administration of
justice.”14 Accordingly, for example, in Frazier v. Heebe,15 without finding
a statutory or constitutional violation, the U.S. Supreme Court invoked its
supervisory authority to void a local rule in the Eastern District of Louisiana
excluding bar applicants “residing and having their office out-of-state, who
are otherwise qualified to join the Bar of the Eastern District.”16 The Court
explained that its “supervisory power over federal courts allows the Court to
intervene to protect the integrity of the federal system, while its authority
over state-court bars is limited to enforcing federal constitutional
requirements.”17 The judicial councils of the circuits have similar
supervisory authority over the local rules of district courts.18
11. As the D.C. Circuit recently explained: “The National Association for the
Advancement of Multijurisdiction Practice (‘NAAMJP’) has conducted a thirty-year
campaign to overturn local rules of practice limiting those who may appear before a particular
state or federal court.” Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Multijurisdiction Prac. v. Howell,
851 F.3d 12, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2017); see also Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of
Multijurisdiction Prac. v. Simandle, 658 F. App’x 127, 130 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting NAAMJP
has “crisscrossed the United States, challenging local bar admission rules”); Blye v. Cal. Sup.
Ct., No. CV 11-5046, 2014 WL 229830, at *2 n.3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2014) (collecting cases
dating back to 1987). Other circuits have joined the chorus of judicial opinions rejecting these
futile challenges. See, e.g., Simandle, 658 F. App’x 127; Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of
Multijurisdiction Prac. v. Lynch, 826 F.3d 191 (4th Cir. 2016); Giannini v. Real, 911 F.2d 354
(9th Cir. 1990). It appears that the Supreme Court has never opined on these challenges. Cf.
Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641, 644 n.1 (1987) (noting that petitioner “also contended that the
local Rules violated the Commerce Clause, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Privileges
and Immunities Clause, and the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution”
but granting relief on another ground).
12. See Kotch v. Bd. of River Port Pilot Comm’rs, 330 U.S. 552, 562 (1947) (discussing
a similar rule for pilot licenses).
13. See Jordan v. City of New London, No. 97CV1012, 1999 WL 780977, at *1 (D. Conn.
Sept. 2, 1999) (“Plaintiff was denied a job opportunity because he had scored higher than
average on a written examination used to screen applicants and, as a result, was deemed
overqualified for the position.”).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 332 (d)(1).
15. 482 U.S. 641 (1987).
16. Id. at 646. Here, “Petitioner d[id] not challenge the requirement of Rule 21.2 that an
attorney must be a member in good standing of the Louisiana Bar.” Id. at 646 n.5.
Accordingly, that issue was left open.
17. Id. at 648 n.7.
18. See Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Multijurisdiction Prac. v. Howell, 851 F.3d
12, 18 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“[A] rule of a district court . . . remain[s] in effect unless modified or
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Although there has been much discussion of the issue,19 perhaps it can be
accepted, at least arguendo, that being admitted to one state bar and passing
a character and fitness investigation is valuable and reasonable for all
attorneys in all areas of practice.20 In addition, federal civil practice often
involves state law issues,21 so even though the question remains debatable, it
is understandable that federal district courts might want civil practitioners to
have passed a state bar examination.22 There is an additional consideration
in the civil context. Many civil cases can be initiated in either federal or state
courts. However, an attorney admitted only to the federal courts in a
particular state would have to sue in federal court or not at all. This, judges
of a district court might reasonably conclude, might increase the federal filing
of marginal cases or cases where federal jurisdiction is proper but where a
disinterested lawyer would have found it beneficial to the client to file in state
court.23
These problems do not arise in criminal practice. Criminal defendants do
not elect the jurisdiction in which they are prosecuted, so there is no risk that
a federal-only defense attorney will forum shop. Similarly, an assistant U.S.
attorney generally can file charges only in federal court but likely can refer

abrogated by the judicial council of the relevant circuit.” (second and third alterations in
original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2071(c)(1))).
19. See, e.g., Joan W. Howarth & Judith Welch Wegner, Ringing Changes: Systems
Thinking About Legal Licensing, 13 FIU L. REV. 383 (2019).
20. Cf. William Wesley Patton, Admitting Law Graduates by Bar Examination Versus
by a Diploma Privilege: A Comparison of Consumer Protection (Sept. 3, 2020) (unpublished
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3686252 [https://perma.cc/VRK7-7BHZ].
21. See Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Multijurisdiction Prac. v. Simandle, 658 F.
App’x 127, 137 (3d Cir. 2016) (stating “federal courts often sit in diversity and apply state
substantive law, so familiarity with state law is a rational basis on which to admit attorneys to
the federal bar of that same state”); see also Giannini v. Real, 911 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.
1990) (justifying California federal bar admission rules by acknowledging that “questions of
California substantive law permeate the range of cases over which the district courts have
subject matter jurisdiction”).
22. The requirements governing eligibility for admission to the bar of the District of
Puerto Rico are in turn prescribed by Local Rule 83A: “Any attorney who is of good personal
and professional character, and who is an active member in good standing of and eligible to
practice before the bar of the highest court of a state . . . is eligible for admission to the bar of
this Court . . . .” D.P.R. LOCAL CIV. R. 83A(a). Passing a written examination “as determined
by the District Bar Examination Committee” is the standard path for gaining admission to this
district. Id. r. 83A(a)(1); see also Mateo v. Empire Gas Co., 841 F. Supp. 2d 574, 576–77
(D.P.R. 2012).
23. See In re Roberts, 682 F.2d 105, 108 (3d Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (“Counsel appointed
to represent the district court points out also that tying district court admission to state bar
membership tends to protect the interests of the public. For example, when a choice of either
a federal or a state forum is available in a particular case an attorney admitted only to the
federal court may choose that forum solely for that reason, possibly disregarding the interests
of his client. Moreover, issues of state law are often dispositive in federal tax cases, further
supporting the application of the state bar requirement to lawyers specializing in federal
taxation.”). Balanced against these considerations is the fact that many districts allow
admission of members of any state bar, including those of other states. Diligent research has
revealed no evidence of studies or reports indicating that “open” district court bars have
inferior levels of practice, more attorney discipline, or other problems.
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cases to state colleagues. With both federal prosecutors and defense
attorneys, then, professional access to a state forum is irrelevant.
What other reasons, consistent with their role in the federal system, might
lead federal judges to want lawyers practicing before them to be members of
the state bar?
I. UNIFORM FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW
Federal criminal practice, unlike state practice or federal civil practice,
draws on a uniform, national body of substantive law that is largely
independent of the criminal law of the states. As the Supreme Court
explained:
Rules that discriminate against nonresident attorneys are even more
difficult to justify in the context of federal-court practice than they are in
the area of state-court practice, where laws and procedures may differ
substantially from State to State. There is a growing body of specialized
federal law and a more mobile federal bar, accompanied by an increased
demand for specialized legal services regardless of state boundaries.24

The Supreme Court has long recognized “the need for uniformity and
consistency of federal criminal law” in both “interpretation and
application.”25 For this reason, the Court has applied a strong presumption
that federal criminal law does not turn on state law.26 In evaluating a federal
sentencing enhancement turning on a prior conviction for “burglary,” the
Court rejected the claim that sentencing turned on state law definitions of
crimes because of the inconsistent results that would follow:
[A] person imprudent enough to shoplift or steal from an automobile in
California would be found, under the Ninth Circuit’s view, to have

24. Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641, 648 n.7 (1987) (citation omitted) (first citing Comisky
& Patterson, supra note 1, at 960–64; and then citing Jerry Simonelli, State Regulation of a
Federal License to Practice Law, N.Y. ST. BAR J., May 1984, at 15, 15).
25. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 464–65 (1990) (citing Ableman v. Booth, 21 Haw.
506, 517–18 (1859)); see also United States v. Bergeman, 592 F.2d 533, 537 (9th Cir. 1979)
(“In the absence of an expression to the contrary, Congress generally intends federal criminal
law to receive a uniform application.” (first citing Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 104
(1943); and then citing United States v. Patz, 584 F.2d 927, 930 (9th Cir. 1978))). Many
scholars have also recognized this point. E.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and Criminal
Law: What the Feds Can Learn from the States, 109 MICH. L. REV. 519, 525–26 (2011)
(noting the desire of the U.S. Department of Justice “to have a central, uniform approach to
federal criminal law”); Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP.
CT. REV. 345, 421 (noting that “federal criminal law dictates uniform, national answers” to
questions of what conduct is prohibited); Rory K. Little, Good Enough for Government
Work?, 14 FED. SENT’G REP. 7, 9 (2001) (“Should federal criminal sentencing take into
account, and seek to accommodate, differing geographic or community opinions regarding the
appropriate punishments for federal crimes? Or is the national applicability and formal
uniformity of available federal criminal punishments (like the uniform definition of federal
crimes) a tenet so basic to the concept of ‘federal criminal law’ that it ought not be tampered
with?”); Wayne A. Logan, Creating A “Hydra in Government”: Federal Recourse to State
Law in Crime Fighting, 86 B.U. L. REV. 65, 66 (2006) (noting “the efficiency and fairness
benefits associated with uniform application of federal criminal law”).
26. See United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 411 (1957).
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committed a burglary constituting a “violent felony” for enhancement
purposes—yet a person who did so in Michigan might not. Without a clear
indication that with the 1986 amendment Congress intended to abandon its
general approach of using uniform categorical definitions to identify
predicate offenses, we do not interpret Congress’ omission of a definition
of “burglary” in a way that leads to odd results of this kind.27

To be sure, in some unusual cases, state law is relevant to federal criminal
liability, but even when, for example, the Assimilative Crimes Act28 borrows
state criminal law for federal enclaves, its meaning and interpretation remain
a federal question.29 In addition, because of venue rules, the potentially
relevant state law might not be the law of the state where the federal court is
located.
Not only is the substantive criminal law uniform in the federal system—
uniformity is also a goal of the application and interpretation of the federal
sentencing guidelines.30 This means, as in the context of substantive criminal
law, “applying the Guidelines without strict reference to state criminal law
definitions.”31 The Supreme Court has also noted the importance of the
“uniform administration of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.”32 In
27. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 591–92 (1990) (“[A]bsent plain indication to
the contrary, federal laws are not to be construed so that their application is dependent on state
law, ‘because the application of federal legislation is nationwide and at times the federal
program would be impaired if state law were to control.’” (quoting Dickerson v. New Banner
Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 119–20 (1983))); Turley, 352 U.S. at 411 (“[I]n the absence of a plain
indication of an intent to incorporate diverse state laws into a federal criminal statute, the
meaning of the federal statute should not be dependent on state law.”).
28. 18 U.S.C. § 13 (original version at ch. 241, 54 Stat. 234, 234 (1940)).
29. See United States v. Collazo, 117 F.3d 793, 795 (5th Cir. 1997) (“Prosecution under
the [Assimilative Crimes Act] does not enforce state law but rather federal law assimilating
state law. Thus, a state court’s interpretation of an assimilated state law is merely persuasive
authority.” (citation omitted) (first citing United States v. Brown, 608 F.2d 551, 553 (5th Cir.
1979); and then citing United States v. Kiliz, 694 F.2d 628, 629 (9th Cir. 1982))).
30. See United States v. Hernandez-Valdovinos, 352 F.3d 1243, 1248 (9th Cir. 2003)
(noting “the need for national uniformity in interpreting the sentencing guidelines”); United
States v. Lauer, 148 F.3d 766, 769 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting “that the Sentencing Commission
has the power and the duty not only to interpret specific provisions of federal statutes
regulating criminal punishment, such as section 2507 of the Crime Control Act of 1990, but
also to establish, in its discretion except insofar as that discretion is cut down by statutes fixing
minimum and maximum penalties, standards designed to promote uniform and rational federal
sentencing” (first citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 991(b), 994(a), (f); and then citing Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 367–70 (1989))).
31. United States v. Brown, 314 F.3d 1216, 1224 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States
v. Brunson, 907 F.2d 117, 121 (10th Cir. 1990)); see also United States v. Diaz-Bonilla, 65
F.3d 875, 877 (10th Cir. 1995) (“A federal criminal law is not generally construed so that its
application is dependent on state law. The purpose of the Guidelines would be frustrated by
an interpretation that gave effect to a state statutory definition, because its application is
nationwide and the federal program’s objective of uniformity would be impaired.” (citation
omitted) (citing Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 119 (1983))).
32. United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 222 (1960); see also, e.g., United States v.
Cole, 496 F.3d 188, 195 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[O]ne purpose of the Federal Rules generally is to
promote uniformity . . . .”); United States v. Weinstein, 452 F.2d 704, 715 (2d Cir. 1971)
(“The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were designed to provide a uniform set of
procedures to govern criminal cases within the federal courts consistent with the requirements
of justice and sound administration.”); United States v. Gray, 448 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir.
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prior centuries, federal criminal trials applied state rules of evidence.33 Now,
however, federal evidence law has been consolidated in the Federal Rules of
Evidence, which courts agree “should apply uniformly and not vary
depending on the state in which the defendant resides.”34
Of course, there are local variations in federal criminal practice, including
those set out in local rules. While many district courts require certification
of familiarity with local rules, few require examination on them. Local rules
are not so voluminous or individuated that state bar membership can be
demanded to ensure familiarity with them. This is particularly so because no
state bar, it seems, tests on the local rules of the local U.S. district courts
located in the state.
Bar admission rules themselves make clear that knowledge of state law is
unnecessary for federal criminal practice. Many local rules allow lawyers
employed by the United States to appear without formal admission to the bar
so long as they are admitted in some state.35 Similarly, an attorney admitted
to any state or federal bar is allowed to practice as a prosecutor or defense
Military courts are
attorney before U.S. military courts-martial.36
1971) (“While the rules are not, and were not intended to be a rigid code having an inflexible
meaning irrespective of the circumstances, they were designed to simplify existing procedure
and to make uniform certain practices in all district courts.” (citation omitted) (first citing
Fallen v. United States, 378 U.S. 139, 142 (1964); and then citing United States v. Debrow,
346 U.S. 374, 376 (1953))).
33. See Vance v. Campbell, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 427, 430 (1861) (“The thirty-fourth section
of the judiciary act provides that the laws of the several States, with the exceptions there stated,
shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States.
This section has been construed to include the rules of evidence prescribed by the laws of the
State in all civil cases at common law not within the exceptions therein mentioned.”); United
States v. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361, 366 (1851) (stating “the rules of evidence in criminal
cases, are the rules which were in force in the respective states when the Judiciary Act of 1789
was passed”), overruled in part by Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467 (1918).
34. United States v. Chase, 340 F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Using federal rules of
evidence and procedure and case law promotes the uniform disposition of criminal matters in
the federal system.” (quoting United States v. DeWater, 846 F.2d 528, 530 (9th Cir. 1988)));
see also Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1497 (3d Cir. 1993) (discussing “Congress’ intent
that the Federal Rules of Evidence have uniform nationwide application”); Boren v. Sable,
887 F.2d 1032, 1038 (10th Cir. 1989) (stating that “the Federal Rules of Evidence are intended
to have uniform nationwide application”); Hale v. United States, 435 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.
1970) (explaining that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26 “contemplates a uniform law of
evidence for the district courts; as a consequence, the criminal procedure of the state in which
the district court is located is inapplicable” (citing Burney v. United States, 339 F.2d 91 (5th
Cir. 1964))).
35. Typical is Northern District of Alabama Local Rule 83.1(c):
Appearance on behalf of United States or by Federal Public Defender’s Office. Any
attorney representing the United States or any agency thereof, having the authority
of the government to appear as its counsel, may appear specially and be heard in
any case in which the government or such agency is a party, without formal or
general admission. Likewise, any attorney of the Federal Public Defender’s Office
may appear specially in any case when appointed to represent a defendant in this
District without formal or general admission.
N.D. ALA. LOCAL R. 83.1(c).
36. See 10 U.S.C. § 827(b) (stating that military trial counsel and defense counsel “must
be a member of the bar of a Federal court or of the highest court of a State,” among other
requirements); JOINT SERV. COMM. ON MIL. JUST., MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED
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“exclusively criminal courts,”37 which have jurisdiction over charges of
“violating generally applicable federal criminal statutes” as well as violations
of military law contained in the Uniform Code of Military Justice.38
II. STATE ATTORNEY REGULATION OF FEDERAL PRACTICE AND THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION’S LATEST WORD
State attorney regulatory systems cannot prohibit authorized attorneys
from appearing in federal courts.39 The key case is Sperry v. Florida ex rel.
Florida Bar,40 which held that state bar authorities could not charge a
federally enrolled patent agent or attorney working in Florida, even if not a
member of the Florida bar, with the unauthorized practice of law.41 “Sperry
therefore stands for the general proposition that where federal law authorizes
an agent to practice before a federal tribunal, the federal law preempts a
state’s licensing requirements to the extent that those requirements hinder or
obstruct the goals of federal law.”42
In re Desilets,43 from the Sixth Circuit, nicely lays out an application of
the rule. Allan Rittenhouse was a lawyer admitted to practice in Texas but
not in Michigan.44 He was, however, admitted to the bar of the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Michigan and participated in bankruptcy
litigation there.45 An opposing party insisted that Rittenhouse was not an
“attorney” entitled to participate or accept fees.46 Per Judge Danny Boggs,
the majority held that “[w]hen state licensing laws purport to prohibit lawyers
from doing that which federal law expressly entitles them to do, the state law
must give way.”47 The court further stated that “[b]ecause Rittenhouse was
properly admitted to the federal bar under the applicable rule, and because
federal standards govern practice before the federal bar, we reject the
bankruptcy court’s determination as adopted by the district court.”48

STATES R. 502(d)(2)(B)(i) (2019), https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/Documents/2019%
20MCM%20(Final)%20(20190108).pdf [https://perma.cc/M3WR-95BH] (stating that
civilian defense counsel may practice if “a member of the bar of a federal court or of the bar
of the highest court of a State”).
37. Porter v. Richardson, 50 C.M.R. 910, 912 (C.M.A. 1975) (Cook, J., dissenting).
38. United States v. Forney, 67 M.J. 271, 277 (C.A.A.F. 2009) (Effron, C.J., concurring)
(citing United States v. Wolford, 62 M.J. 418, 423 (C.A.A.F. 2006)).
39. See Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957) (“The two judicial systems of
courts, the state judicatures and the federal judiciary, have autonomous control over the
conduct of their officers, among whom, in the present context, lawyers are included.”).
40. 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
41. Id. at 384–85.
42. Surrick v. Killion, 449 F.3d 520, 530 (3d Cir. 2006); see also People v. Shell, 148
P.3d 162, 174 (Colo. 2006) (“It is certainly true that the Colorado federal courts can allow
individuals to engage in legal practice in federal courts who would not otherwise be allowed
to practice law in Colorado state courts.”).
43. 291 F.3d 925 (6th Cir. 2002).
44. Id. at 927.
45. Id.
46. See id. at 926.
47. Id. at 930.
48. Id. at 931.
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Similarly, the Third Circuit held in Surrick v. Killion49 that an attorney not
authorized to practice law in a state could not be prohibited from operating a
law office in that state representing clients before a federal court to which he
was admitted.50
Judge Gilbert S. Merritt Jr. vigorously dissented in In re Desilets,
astonished that a lawyer admitted by one state could practice in federal courts
in another and concerned about who would monitor the attorney’s
professional conduct:
I did not know until I read Judge Boggs’ opinion that for lawyers it is now
a regular, everyday practice—part of the profession’s “quotidian forms of
practice” (to use the court’s words)—for lawyers to practice daily in the
federal courts of State A, say Michigan or Tennessee, while living and
being licensed to practice only in State B, say New York or Florida.
....
In addition, if we follow Judge Boggs’ reasoning for the court, licensing in
federal court becomes an exclusively federal matter without giving
credence or comity to the licensing requirements of the state courts. . . . We
do not need an elaborate national agency to regulate licensing, removing
and disciplining federal lawyers, and the federal courts themselves are not
equipped to handle this task alone without the help of the state courts and
their rules of practice.51

In re Desilets was decided in June 2002.52 In August 2002, the American
Bar Association (ABA) Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice
addressed these issues by proposing amendments to the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, which were approved by the ABA House of Delegates
and have been adopted by many states.53 The new rules were consistent with
In re Desilets in that they contemplated allowing lawyers to open offices for
regular federal practice in states where they were not licensed.54 The
49. 449 F.3d 520 (3d Cir. 2006).
50. Id. at 533 (“We agree with the District Court that maintaining a law office is
‘reasonably within the scope of the practice authorized’ by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1654 & 2071 and the
local rules and that the state’s regulation of such conduct hinders Surrick’s federal license to
practice law.” (quoting Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Fla. Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 402 n.47 (1963))).
51. In re Desilets, 291 F.3d at 931–32 (Merritt, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 931 (majority
opinion)).
52. Id. at 925.
53. See AM. BAR ASS’N CTR. FOR PRO. RESP., CLIENT REPRESENTATION IN THE 21ST
CENTURY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE (2002),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/fin
al_mjp_rpt_121702_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/U26J-5VAX]; Arthur F. Greenbaum,
Multijurisdictional Practice and the Influence of Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5—
an Interim Assessment, 43 AKRON L. REV. 729, 737 (2010).
54. ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5(d) states:
A lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction or in a foreign jurisdiction,
and not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction or the equivalent
thereof . . . may provide legal services through an office or other systematic and
continuous presence in this jurisdiction that:
(1) are provided to the lawyer’s employer or its organizational affiliates, are not
services for which the forum requires pro hac vice admission; and when
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amendments solved the problem of regulatory authority by granting states
where the practice occurs disciplinary jurisdiction.55 As a result, federal
courts rely on state enforcement but, under anti-commandeering principles,
presumably cannot require state enforcement against lawyers in their
jurisdictions who are members of the state bar and those who are not
members of the state bar in precisely the same way. On the other hand, the
ABA did not extend the privilege of federal practice without a state license
to lawyers disbarred or suspended in any jurisdiction.
III. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO PRACTICE
In drafting, applying, and reviewing rules, federal courts should consider
constitutional values and requirements. In criminal cases, bar admission has
constitutional overtones. “A criminal ‘defendant’s [Sixth Amendment] right
to the counsel of his choice includes the right to have an out-of-state lawyer
admitted pro hac vice.’”56 As the Third Circuit explained, the United States
enjoys
“a highly mobile bar that has at its disposal modern transportation and
communication.” Therefore, the number of occasions on which a defendant
will desire to be represented by counsel pro hac vice is frequent and will be
increasingly so. Arbitrarily to deny a defendant the right to obtain counsel
from outside the state would untowardly limit the possible choices the
defendant might have. Thus, we conclude that the right to counsel pro hac
vice is encompassed analytically within the right to counsel of choice, and
as such should be examined within the analytic framework generally
employed in right to counsel of choice cases.57

Accordingly, courts have required the relaxation of otherwise applicable
court rules, such as limits on the number of pro hac vice appearances
permitted.58
performed by a foreign lawyer and requires advice on the law of this or another
U.S. jurisdiction or of the United States, such advice shall be based upon the
advice of a lawyer who is duly licensed and authorized by the jurisdiction to
provide such advice; or
(2) are services that the lawyer is authorized by federal law or other law or rule
to provide in this jurisdiction.
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.5(d) (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2020).
55. See id. r. 8.5(a) (“A lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the
disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, regardless of where the lawyer’s conduct occurs. A
lawyer not admitted in this jurisdiction is also subject to the disciplinary authority of this
jurisdiction if the lawyer provides or offers to provide any legal services in this jurisdiction.
A lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary authority of both this jurisdiction and another
jurisdiction for the same conduct.”).
56. In re Bundy, 840 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2016) (alteration in original) (quoting
United States v. Walters, 309 F.3d 589, 591 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also Note, The Criminal
Defendant’s Right to Retain Counsel Pro Hac Vice, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 785, 801 (1989).
57. Fuller v. Diesslin, 868 F.2d 604, 607 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting the district court
opinion).
58. See United States v. Panzardi Alvarez, 816 F.2d 813, 817 (1st Cir. 1987) (first citing
Lefton v. City of Hattiesburg, 333 F.2d 280, 285–86 (5th Cir. 1964); and then citing Sanders
v. Russell, 401 F.2d 241, 246 (5th Cir. 1968)); Sanders v. Russell, 401 F.2d 241, 246 (5th Cir.
1968) (finding it “difficult to see how the concern of the District Court in decorum, dignity,
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However, in Leis v. Flynt,59 the Supreme Court held that an attorney had
no individual constitutional right to pro hac vice admission in a state court;
the opinion expressly noted that it was not deciding whether the prospective
client’s Sixth Amendment interests would require admission.60 In United
States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,61 a California attorney sought pro hac vice
admission to a U.S. district court in Missouri to defend a drug prosecution.62
The Supreme Court held that erroneous refusal was a structural error to which
harmless error analysis did not apply.63
Gonzalez-Lopez seemed to endorse the holding that pro hac vice admission
in criminal cases is of constitutional dimension. While the Court noted that
the right to counsel of choice was not unlimited, including that a defendant
may not “insist on representation by a person who is not a member of the
bar,” the Court found that neither that nor other “limitations on the right to
choose one’s counsel is relevant here.”64 That is, the “not a member of the
bar” exception was inapplicable because the lawyer at issue was admitted to
the California bar, even though he was not a member of the bar of the
particular federal court where the case was pending.
IV. WHAT ELSE?
Several other possible reasons for requiring state bar membership are
suggested by Russell v. Hug,65 a Ninth Circuit case upholding a membership
requirement for participation on the Criminal Justice Act Panel.66 The
plaintiff was a member of the bar of the district court and had “sixteen years
experience prosecuting federal criminal cases as an Assistant United States
Attorney, including six years in the Northern District of California,” but was
not a member of the California bar.67
The court held that even if the “California bar membership requirement is
an attempt to limit competition,” that would be irrelevant under an equal
protection analysis.68 But presumably under the Supreme Court’s or a
judicial council’s supervisory authority, a naked desire to increase the
competency, good character or amenability to service and discipline is served by a numerical
limitation”).
59. 439 U.S. 438 (1979).
60. Id. at 442 n.4 (“The dissenting opinion also suggests that a client’s interest in having
out-of-state counsel is implicated by this decision. The court below, however, ‘did not reach
the issue of whether the constitutional rights of Flynt and Hustler Magazine had also been
violated,’ recognizing as it did that a federal-court injunction enjoining a state criminal
prosecution on a ground that could be asserted by the defendant in the state proceeding would
conflict with this Court’s holding in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).” (citations
omitted) (first citing id. at 445 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting); and then quoting Flynt v. Leis,
574 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1978))).
61. 548 U.S. 140 (2006).
62. Id. at 142.
63. Id. at 151–52.
64. Id. at 152.
65. 275 F.3d 812 (9th Cir. 2002).
66. Id. at 815.
67. Id. at 816.
68. Id. at 820.
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incomes of lawyers who are members of the state bar would not be a
legitimate federal interest.
The court noted that bar membership aided disciplinary enforcement.69
However, now that it is clear that state disciplinary authorities can act against
nonmembers and members for their actions in federal court and that states
have taken on those responsibilities,70 this rationale is no longer persuasive.71
Another rationale was that California had particularly high bar standards,
which the district court could reasonably adopt:
Because there are more than fifty bar examinations in the United States, the
minimum standard of competence required to be a “lawyer” arguably varies
considerably among the states. Requiring membership in the California
Bar allows the Northern District of California to be sure that all attorneys
assigned to its Indigent Defense Panel are at least capable enough to clear
the standard required in California—a standard with which the Northern

69. Id.
70. California Rule of Professional Conduct 8.5(a) states:
Disciplinary Authority. A lawyer admitted to practice in California is subject to the
disciplinary authority of California, regardless of where the lawyer’s conduct
occurs. A lawyer not admitted in California is also subject to the disciplinary
authority of California if the lawyer provides or offers to provide any legal services
in California. A lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary authority of both
California and another jurisdiction for the same conduct.
CAL. PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.5(a); see also In re Gadda, 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 416, 2002 WL
31012596, at *2 (Bar Ct. Aug. 26, 2002) (“In this regard, the California Supreme Court clearly
held more than 60 years ago that, ‘[i]f an attorney admitted to practice in the courts of this
state commits acts in reference to federal court litigation which reflect on his integrity and
fitness to enjoy the rights and privileges of an attorney in the state courts, proceedings may be
taken against him in the state court.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Geibel v. State Bar, 79
P.2d 1073, 1074 (Cal. 1938) (en banc))). Another Ninth Circuit case relied on state
disciplinary assistance as a ground for requiring State Bar of Arizona membership in the
district court. Gallo v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 349 F.3d 1169, 1182 (9th Cir. 2003). Since then,
Arizona, like California, assumed disciplinary jurisdiction over lawyers practicing in federal
court. ARIZ. PRO. CONDUCT R. 5.5(h) (“Any attorney who engages in the multijurisdictional
practice of law in Arizona, whether authorized in accordance with these Rules or not, shall be
subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct and the Rules of the Supreme Court regarding
attorney discipline in the State of Arizona.”).
71. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.5(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020); State ex rel.
York v. W. Va. Off. of Disciplinary Couns., 744 S.E.2d 293, 303 (W. Va. 2013) (“Principles
of federal preemption do not prohibit state action, however, where such state action does not
interfere with the requirements of federal law. In Kroll v. Finnerty, 242 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir.
2001), for instance, the United States Court of Appeals held that an attorney practicing patent
law in New York and also a member of the state bar was subject to state disciplinary authority,
with no violation of federal preemption principles.”); see also, e.g., State v. Lang, 323 P.3d
740, 744 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014); Ky. Bar Ass’n v. Brooks, 325 S.W.3d 283, 285 (Ky. 2010).
But cf. Disciplinary Couns. v. Harris, 996 N.E.2d 921, 925–26 (Ohio 2013) (“Here, the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio exercised its authority and declined
to sanction Harris or order the disgorgement of attorney fees for his representation of Skeel in
bankruptcy proceedings. Because the alleged misconduct involving Skeel occurred before the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio and because that court has
the power to discipline Harris for his practice before it, we dismiss this charge in deference to
the disciplinary authority of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of
Ohio.”).
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District is familiar, and a standard that is quite possibly higher than that of
many other states.72

This rationale gets to the heart of the matter. Can federal judges hold that
practice in their districts is different and special, requiring a higher class of
attorneys than those tolerated in slower, dumber federal districts? The idea
seems inconsistent with a federal system of uniform laws and rules. And if
federal courts in California can require California membership, what is it that
justifies the other states in the Ninth Circuit requiring state bar membership,
when obviously they should at least allow the superior lawyers licensed in
elite California to practice?
Criminal law tends to be poor people’s law, at least the application of rules
of this sort.73 The United States generally will not, for lack of funds, fail to
muster whatever legal resources it deems necessary for a particular criminal
matter. Appropriately, federal attorneys get special consideration in the
admission process74 and are often specially accommodated in the local rules.
Wealthy defendants will have no difficulty fielding teams of pro hac vice and
local counsel. The burden of this practice will fall on defendants, and
defendants only, and only those who are of modest means.
For this reason, pro hac vice admission is an unsatisfactory substitute, as
the Supreme Court held in Frazier:
Respondents contend that nonresident lawyers are not totally foreclosed
from Eastern District practice because they can appear pro hac vice. In
Piper, however, we recognized that this alternative does not allow the
nonresident attorney to practice “on the same terms as a resident member
of the bar.” An attorney not licensed by a district court must repeatedly file
motions for each appearance on a pro hac vice basis. In addition, in order
to appear pro hac vice under local Rule 21.5, a lawyer must also associate
with a member of the Eastern District Bar, who is required to sign all court
documents. This association, of course, imposes a financial and
administrative burden on nonresident counsel. Furthermore, it is ironic that
“local” counsel may be located much farther away from the New Orleans
courthouse than the out-of-state counsel. Thus, the availability of

72. Russell, 275 F.3d at 819.
73. See Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, a
National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1032 (2006); Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The
Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases: Still a National Crisis?, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1564,
1565 (2020). Although federal judicial officers are generally of exceptional ability and
character, possibly some have the frailties afflicting other humans. See Irene Oritseweyinmi
Joe, Regulating Implicit Bias in the Federal Criminal Process, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 965, 966
(2020); David E. Patton, Federal Public Defense in an Age of Inquisition, 122 YALE L.J. 2578,
2584 (2013); Susan L. Wynne & Michael S. Vaughn, Eligibility for Court-Appointed Counsel
in Federal Cases: A Review of Legislation and Case Law, 80 ALB. L. REV. 899, 899 (2017).
74. United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 791 F.3d 945, 958 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Because Judge
Jones did not articulate a valid reason for his pro hac vice admission policy, comments like
these created a real risk that the policy would, rightly or wrongly, be viewed as an
encroachment on the domain of the political branches.”).
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appearance pro hac vice is not a reasonable alternative for an out-of-state
attorney who seeks general admission to the Eastern District’s Bar.75

CONCLUSION
In 2009, the Ninth Circuit held that a lawyer admitted only in Oregon could
collect a fee based on work done in the central district of California, in
association with attorneys admitted there, despite that lawyer’s lack of
admission.76 The court noted that even in decades before, when “there were
no personal computers, no Internet, no Blackberries, no teleconferencing, no
emails, and the only person who had a two-way wrist radio was cartoon
character Dick Tracy,” a leading judge “observed that we live in an ‘age of
increased specialization and high mobility of the bar.’”77 The court
concluded that “[c]urrent law does not compel us to be judicial Luddites, and
we may properly accommodate many of the realities of modern law practice,
while still securing to federal courts the ability to control and discipline those
who practice before them.”78
Because federal criminal practice involves application of a single body of
substantive criminal law, evidence, procedure, and sentencing law, an
attorney admitted to one U.S. district court should be permitted to defend
criminal cases in any district in the United States. Federal courts are perfectly
capable of identifying and remedying inadequate professional practice or
disciplinary violations that occur before them and can use their own
disciplinary machinery or borrow that of the states, as they prefer. Increasing
the ranks of the lawyers available to defend criminal cases and pursue
postconviction relief would mitigate the crisis of indigent representation.

75. Frazier v. Hebee, 482 U.S. 641, 650–51 (1987) (citations omitted) (first quoting Sup.
Ct. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 277 n.2 (1985); and then citing In re Frazier, 594 F. Supp. 1173,
1177 (E.D. La. 1984)); see also Robert L. Misner, Local Associated Counsel in the Federal
District Courts: A Call for Change, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 345, 345 (1982) (“The supporters
of local association apparently justify these rules on two bases: protection of the client and
protection of the power and dignity of the court. In practice, however, local rules do not
protect the interest of clients; rather, they affirmatively encroach upon the client’s right to
choose his counsel.”).
76. Winterrowd v. Am. Gen. Annuity Ins. Co., 556 F.3d 815, 817 (9th Cir. 2009).
77. Id. at 819 (quoting Spanos v. Skouras, 364 F.2d 161, 170 (2d Cir. 1966)).
78. Id. at 820.

